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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 











KEYE A. WYSOCKI, Individually and in his capacity as Corporal for the  
Pennsylvania State Police; KEITH HAGAN, Individually and in his capacity  
as trooper for the Pennsylvania State Police; RENEE BURROWS, Individually  
and in her official capacity as shift manager for American Airlines Group, Inc.;  
AMERICAN AIRLINES GROUP INC, S/I/I/T US Airways Group, Inc.; 
JOHN DOES 1-10 
______________ 
 
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA 
(E.D. Pa. No. 2-14-cv-04185) 
District Judge: Honorable Mark A. Kearney 
______________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
September 16, 2016 
______________ 
 
Before: CHAGARES, GREENAWAY, JR. and RESTREPO, Circuit Judges. 
 






                                              
 * This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and, pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7, 
does not constitute binding precedent. 
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RESTREPO, Circuit Judge. 
 Appellant Kalilah Brantley filed this civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.  
Brantley alleges two claims against Appellee Pennsylvania State Police Corporal Keye 
Wysocki1—malicious prosecution in violation of the Fourth Amendment and retaliatory 
prosecution in violation of her First Amendment right to free speech.  The District Court 
dismissed the malicious prosecution claim on Rule 12(b)(6) grounds and granted 
summary judgment for Wysocki on the First Amendment claim on qualified immunity 
grounds.2  We will affirm.   
I 
 Brantley worked for a private employer at the Philadelphia International Airport, 
where she was supervised by Rene Burrows.  Around Christmas 2010, the two had a 
dispute over mandatory overtime.  Brantley alleged that Burrows was violating union 
overtime policy.  Burrows denied this.  Burrows, furthermore, believed that Brantley had 
committed a workplace infraction by clocking out of a mandatory overtime shift without 
authorization.   
 On December 30, 2010, Brantley, Burrows, a union representative and another 
employee held a heated “coaching” meeting in an airport conference room to discuss 
Brantley’s alleged infraction.  App. 548.  Brantley’s cell phone was on the table during 
                                              
 1 Brantley previously raised claims against other defendants dismissed by the 
District Court.  Her appeal is limited to her claims against Wysocki.   
 
 2 Brantley also alleged a malicious prosecution claim under Pennsylvania state 
law, but concedes that this claim is barred by Pennsylvania’s sovereign immunity statute, 
1 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 2310.  See also 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 8522 (exceptions to sovereign 
immunity inapplicable).   
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the meeting.  Midway through the meeting, Burrows became suspicious that Brantley was 
recording the meeting on her cell phone.  Burrows confronted Brantley, who admitted 
that she was recording.   
 Sometime after the December 30, 2010 meeting, Brantley posted a public letter in 
an employee break room criticizing Burrows.  Burrows was admittedly “disgusted” by 
the letter.  App. 246.   
 Burrows spoke with her husband, a police officer in New Jersey, and with a 
corporate security officer.  Based upon these conversations, she concluded that Brantley 
had violated the Pennsylvania Wiretapping and Electronic Surveillance Control Act 
(“Wiretap Act”), 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5703.  Burrows enlisted the aid of Appellee 
Wysocki, who often worked at the airport.  Burrows told Wysocki that Brantley had 
illegally recorded the “coaching” meeting.   
 On January 18, 2011, Wysocki accompanied Burrows to a Philadelphia Police 
Department station inside the airport, where Burrows filed a complaint against Brantley.  
The police, however, brushed off Burrows by telling her to obtain a copy of the recording 
herself.  Burrows told Wysocki, who thought the officer who took her complaint was 
being “lazy.”  App. 307, 309.  Wysocki began to investigate Burrows’ complaint himself, 
with permission from his supervisor and a deputy district attorney.   
 On February 1, 2011, Wysocki interviewed Burrows at the airport.  Burrows told 
Wysocki that Brantley recorded the “coaching” meeting without her knowledge.  She told 
him that she ended the meeting as soon as she learned that Brantley was recording it.  She 
also told him that she reported “the possible recording” to a supervisor.  App. 534.   
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 On February 8, 2011, Wysocki confronted Brantley at work and demanded her cell 
phone.  Wysocki admittedly told Brantley that if she did not give him the phone, he 
would “physically take it from [her] hand.”  App. 328.  Brantley complied.  Wysocki 
escorted her into a break room where he copied the recording onto his own phone.  
Brantley admitted to Wysocki that she had recorded Burrows without her knowledge or 
consent, but maintained that this was not illegal or against company policy.  
 Wysocki personally signed a criminal complaint, charging Brantley with a 
Wiretap Act violation.  Brantley received a summons by mail and was prosecuted in state 
court.  She filed a suppression motion.  The trial court granted the motion and the 
Superior Court affirmed on interlocutory appeal.  Commonwealth v. Brantley, No. 376 
EDA 2012, 2013 WL 11288850 (Pa. Super. Ct. Jan. 11, 2013).  The Commonwealth 
nolle prossed the case.   
 This civil rights action followed.  The District Court dismissed Brantley’s Fourth 
Amendment malicious prosecution claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).  
The District Court granted summary judgment for Wysocki on the First Amendment 
retaliatory prosecution claim on qualified immunity grounds.   
II 
 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331.  We have 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.   
 We exercise plenary review over the grant of a motion to dismiss under Rule 
12(b)(6).  Kaymark v. Bank of Am., 783 F.3d 168, 174 (3d Cir. 2015).  We accept as true 
all well-pled factual allegations and construe all inferences in the light most favorable to 
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plaintiff.  Id.  We also exercise plenary review over a grant of a motion for summary 
judgment.  Johnson v. Knorr, 477 F.3d 75, 81 (3d Cir. 2007).  We will affirm if “there is 
no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).  We may affirm on any grounds supported by the 
record.  Kossler v. Crisanti, 564 F.3d 181, 186 (3d Cir. 2009) (en banc).  
III 
A 
 The District Court dismissed Brantley’s Fourth Amendment malicious prosecution 
claim under Rule 12(b)(6).  Brantley’s notice of appeal does not specify that she is 
appealing this order.  However, she argues the merits of her Fourth Amendment 
malicious prosecution claim in her brief.  Therefore, we must first address the scope of 
our jurisdiction.   
 Rule 3(c) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure requires that a notice of 
appeal “designate the judgment, order, or part thereof being appealed.”  Fed. R. App. P. 
3(c)(1)(B).  Nevertheless, we construe notices of appeal liberally.  Polonski v. Trump Taj 
Mahal Assocs., 137 F.3d 139, 144 (3d Cir. 1998).  We have repeatedly recognized an 
exception to Rule 3 that allows us to “review earlier non-final orders not specified in the 
notice of appeal where (1) there is a connection between the specified and unspecified 
order; (2) the intention to appeal the unspecified order is apparent; and (3) the opposing 
party is not prejudiced and has a full opportunity to brief the issues.”  Gen. Motors Corp. 
v. New A.C. Chevrolet, Inc., 263 F.3d 296, 311 n.3 (3d Cir. 2001); see also Polonski, 137 
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F.3d at 144.  As these requirements are met here, we will review the District Court’s 
order dismissing Brantley’s Fourth Amendment malicious prosecution claim.   
 A Fourth Amendment malicious prosecution claim requires a plaintiff to plead 
these elements:  
(1) the defendant[] initiated a criminal proceeding;  
(2) the criminal proceeding ended in plaintiff’s favor;  
(3) the proceeding was initiated without probable cause;  
(4) the defendant[] acted maliciously or for a purpose other 
than bringing the plaintiff to justice; and  
(5) the plaintiff suffered deprivation of liberty consistent with 
the concept of seizure as a consequence of a legal proceeding. 
 
Kossler, 564 F.3d at 186 (quotation marks omitted) (quoting Estate of Smith v. Marasco, 
318 F.3d 497, 521 (3d Cir. 2003)).  The District Court properly dismissed Brantley’s 
Fourth Amendment malicious prosecution claim because she did not allege the fifth 
element, a deprivation of liberty.  
 “[P]retrial custody and some onerous types of pretrial, non-custodial restrictions 
constitute a Fourth Amendment seizure” for a malicious prosecution claim.  Black v. 
Montgomery Cty., No. 15-3399, 2016 WL 4525230, at *6 (3d Cir. Aug. 30, 2016) 
(quoting DiBella v. Borough of Beachwood, 407 F.3d 599, 603 (3d Cir. 2005)).  To 
determine whether there was a deprivation of liberty, we may consider, inter alia, 
whether a plaintiff was incarcerated, was detained in the police station, posted bond, was 
required to contact pretrial services, was prohibited from travelling or was required to 
travel to attend court.  Id. at *6-7.  
 Brantley’s Second Amended Complaint alleges none of these facts.  Rather, she 
alleges only that she “received a police summons by mail” and that the trial court held a 
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two-day suppression hearing.  App. 50.  These facts alone do not amount to a deprivation 
of liberty.  DiBella, 407 F.3d at 603.  Thus, the District Court properly dismissed the 
Fourth Amendment malicious prosecution claim.   
B 
 Brantley also raises a claim of retaliatory prosecution in violation of her First 
Amendment right to free speech.  The District Court granted summary judgment for 
Wysocki on qualified immunity grounds.  The District Court found that there was a 
constitutional violation, but that the right was not clearly established.  We will affirm on 
alternative grounds, finding no constitutional violation and not reaching the question 
whether the right was clearly established.   
 “Qualified immunity shields federal and state officials from money damages 
unless a plaintiff pleads facts showing (1) that the official violated a statutory or 
constitutional right, and (2) that the right was ‘clearly established’ at the time of the 
challenged conduct.”  Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 735 (2011) (citation omitted).  
“A Government official’s conduct violates clearly established law when, at the time of 
the challenged conduct, ‘[t]he contours of [a] right [are] sufficiently clear’ that every 
‘reasonable official would have understood that what he is doing violates that right.’”  Id. 
at 741 (alterations in original) (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 
(1987)).   
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 As is within our discretion, we address the first prong of the qualified immunity 
analysis, whether there was a constitutional violation.  Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 
223, 242 (2009).  This is the most “fair and efficient disposition” of this case.  Id.3   
 “[A]s a general matter the First Amendment prohibits government officials from 
subjecting an individual to retaliatory actions, including criminal prosecutions, for 
speaking out.”  Hartman v. Moore, 547 U.S. 250, 256 (2006) (citation omitted).  To 
establish a First Amendment retaliation claim, a plaintiff “‘must prove (1) that [s]he 
engaged in constitutionally-protected activity; (2) that the government responded with 
retaliation; and (3) that the protected activity caused the retaliation.’”  George v. Rehiel, 
738 F.3d 562, 585 (3d Cir. 2013) (quoting Eichenlaub v. Twp. of Indiana, 385 F.3d 274, 
282 (3d Cir. 2004)).  Wysocki argues that summary judgment was proper because 
Brantley failed to prove causation.   
 Causation in this context is defined as “but-for causation, without which the 
adverse action would not have been taken.”  Hartman, 547 U.S. at 260.  Ordinarily, 
“upon a prima facie showing of retaliatory harm, the burden shifts to the defendant 
official to demonstrate that even without the impetus to retaliate he would have taken the 
action complained of (such as firing the employee).”  Id.  However, under Hartman, 
where the plaintiff alleges that the particular act of retaliation is criminal prosecution, 
causation requires a special method of proof—the plaintiff must plead and prove the 
absence of probable cause.  Id. at 265-66.  This requirement applies whether the 
                                              
 3 For reasons of constitutional avoidance, we will often begin by determining 
whether a right was clearly established, although beginning with the constitutional 
question was more efficient here.  Camreta v. Greene, 563 U.S. 692, 705-07 (2011). 
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defendant induced another person to file charges, as in Hartman, or initiated the 
prosecution himself, as Wysocki did.  See Miller v. Mitchell, 598 F.3d 139, 154 (3d Cir. 
2010).   
 In its analysis, the District Court did not address the Hartman requirement that 
Brantley prove the absence of probable cause.  Rather, the District Court concluded that a 
jury could find causation based upon the “temporal proximity” between Brantley’s 
“protests” regarding union policy and her criminal prosecution.  App. 11.  We exercise 
our discretion to apply Hartman for the first time on appeal.  Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 
106, 121 (1976).  We turn then to the ultimate issue—whether Brantley has proven for 
summary judgment purposes that Wysocki arrested her without probable cause.  
  “[P]robable cause to arrest exists when the facts and circumstances within the 
arresting officer’s knowledge are sufficient in themselves to warrant a reasonable person 
to believe that an offense has been or is being committed by the person to be arrested.”  
Orsatti v. N.J. State Police, 71 F.3d 480, 483 (3d Cir. 1995).  In applying “this practical 
and common-sensical standard, we have consistently looked to the totality of the 
circumstances.”  Florida v. Harris, 133 S. Ct. 1050, 1055 (2013).  We “reject[] rigid 
rules, bright-line tests, and mechanistic inquiries in favor of a more flexible, all-things-
considered approach.”  Id. (citing Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983)).   
 The existence of probable case is ordinarily a factual issue.  Halsey v. Pfeiffer, 750 
F.3d 273, 300 (3d Cir. 2014).  Summary judgment is not appropriate if there are factual 
disputes “bearing on the issue or if ‘reasonable minds could differ’” as to whether there 
was probable cause.  Id. (citation omitted).  Conversely, we may grant summary 
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judgment if “no genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether” there was probable 
cause.  Sherwood v. Mulvihill, 113 F.3d 396, 401 (3d Cir. 1997).   
 In Brantley’s case, the statute at issue is Section 5703 of the Wiretap Act, which 
provides: “a person is guilty of a felony of the third degree if he: . . . intentionally 
intercepts, endeavors to intercept, or procures any other person to intercept or endeavor to 
intercept any wire, electronic or oral communication . . . .”  18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5703(1).  
An oral communication is “[a]ny oral communication uttered by a person possessing an 
expectation that such communication is not subject to interception under circumstances 
justifying such expectation.  The term does not include any electronic communication.”  
18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5702.    
 Under Pennsylvania law, a Wiretap Act violation for interception of an oral 
communication requires proof: 
(1) that [the claimant] engaged in a communication; (2) that 
[s]he possessed an expectation that the communication would 
not be intercepted; (3) that [her] expectation was justifiable 
under the circumstances; and (4) that the defendant attempted 
to, or successfully intercepted the communication, or 
encouraged another to do so. 
 
Kelly v. Carlisle, 622 F.3d 248, 257 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting Agnew v. Dupler, 717 A.2d 
519, 522 (Pa. 1998)).   
 We examine the expectation of non-interception “in accordance with the principles 
surrounding the right of privacy.”  Agnew, 717 A.2d at 523.  We ask whether the claimant 
had an expectation of privacy and “whether that expectation is one that society is 
prepared to recognize as reasonable.”  Id.  The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has relied 
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upon several facts “belying” a justifiable expectation of non-interception.  Kelly, 622 
F.3d at 258.  These include that “‘oral interrogations of suspects by the police are 
generally recorded’”; that a participant is taking notes; that third parties are present and 
that others can overhear the conversation.  Id. at 258 (quoting Commonwealth v. Henlen, 
564 A.2d 905, 906 (Pa. 1989)); id. at 257 (citing Agnew, 717 A.2d at 524). 
 In the instant case, there was probable cause to conclude that Brantley violated the 
Wiretap Act.  Burrows told Wysocki that Brantley recorded the “coaching” meeting 
without her knowledge.  She told him that she ended the meeting immediately after she 
learned that Brantley was recording it.4  She also told him that she reported the recording 
to a supervisor.  There is no evidence that other “coaching” meetings at Brantley’s 
private employer were ever recorded.  Wysocki also conducted a separate interview of 
Brantley, who admitted that she recorded the meeting without the knowledge or consent 
of Burrows.  In addition, Wysocki obtained a copy of the recording.   
 In response, Brantley contends that there was no probable cause because Wysocki 
lacked evidence that Burrows had a “justifiable” expectation of non-interception.  Kelly, 
622 F.3d at 257.  She points out that other individuals were at the “coaching” meeting 
and that her cell phone was visible on the table.  Although Brantley does not argue this 
point, we also acknowledge that Brantley was taking notes.  These facts could describe 
                                              
 4  There is some evidence that the meeting continued after Brantley told Burrows 
that she was recording.  However, this factual dispute is not material to the probable 
cause determination because the information was not available to Wysocki.  See Harris, 
133 S. Ct. at 1055.  Wysocki interviewed Burrows, who told him that the meeting ended 
immediately after Brantley admitted to recording it.  Wysocki also interviewed Brantley, 




many workplace meetings.  Alone, they do not undermine our conclusion that there was 
probable cause to arrest Brantley for recording the “coaching” meeting.  We emphasize 
that this arrest took place in 2010, amidst the recording technology of that day.  We also 
emphasize that “we are concerned here only with the question of probable cause, not 
[Brantley]’s guilt or innocence.”  Wright v. City of Phila., 409 F.3d 595, 603 (3d Cir. 
2005).  Thus, the District Court properly granted summary judgment for Wysocki on the 
First Amendment retaliatory prosecution claim. 
IV 
 For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the District Court is affirmed.     
